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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER,
:

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT

:

20030330-CA

Petitioner/Appellee,
vs .
ERICH ROSS DIENER,
Respondent/Appellant.

AN APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER (3/25/2003), BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
The Hon. Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding.
(Trial Court Case No. 98-490-1948 DA)

Respondent/Appellant, Erich Diener, by and through counsel,
submits the following reply brief:

REPLY TO APPELLEE'S ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee Tiffany Jacobs Diener did not file an appeal.

Her

gratuitous recitation of "issues presented for review" in Mr.
Diener's appeal is not helpful.

The opening brief filed by

appellant, Erich Ross Diener, sets forth the issues presented for
review and now before this Court.
court.

No other issues are before the

REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record does not support Tiffany Diener's statement of
certain facts:
1.

Tiffany states "Mr. Diener told Tiffany that he

considered [$5000.00 paid toward his] tuition a loan . . . ."
Brief of Appellee, p. 4 (citing Transcript, p. 56). Nowhere does
the record contain such a statement.

Rather, the money Tiffany

paid to help Erich attend Harvard for a semester was identified
as an "investment in [the parties'] future."

Transcript, p. 61.

Regardless, there is no mention of the "Harvard" money in the
original decree.
2.

Transcript, p. 62.

Tiffany indicates that she "purchased a number of

things for Erich's benefit prior to the marriage because Mr.
Diener often talked her into buying such things, saying that he
would pay Tiffany back later."

Brief of Appellee, p. 4.

There

is no mention of these items nor any indication of pre-marital
debts (if indeed such existed) in the original decree.
Decree (R. 36); Transcript, p. 9.

See

Furthermore, there is no

mention of any debts (if indeed such existed), that Erich owed to
Tiffany in the decree.
3.

Transcript, p. 9.

Tiffany makes much of a whole life insurance policy that

was purchased.

Brief of Appellee, p. 3 & 4.

in the record to that policy is vague:
2

The sole reference

Q. [By John Call] She also had a life insurance
policy, a whole life policy that was purchased for her
after her parents died?
A.
[By Erich Diener] Okay.
Q. Do you recall that?
A. I think so, yes sir?
Q. During the marriage was that ever cashed out?
A.

It may have been.

Transcript, p. 36.

There is no evidence or indication in the

record as to the cash value.

Thus, Ms. Diener's reference is not

helpful.
4.

Tiffany indicates, "Mr. Diener reviewed the matter

[divorce] at least once with a Judge Advocate General attorney
. . ."

Brief of Appellee, p. 4.

That is not accurate.

Erich

generally consulted with a JAG attorney while stationed at Fort
Meade, Maryland in 1997 several months prior to the instigation
of the divorce action.

Transcript, p. 4 & 7.

was not filed until March 13, 1998.

The divorce action

Thus, Mr. Diener did not

have the matter "reviewed" by a JAG attorney.

Furthermore, he

was not represented by counsel at the time of the divorce decree
or in the original proceeding.
5.

Transcript, p. 4 & 16.

Tiffany asserts that "Mr. Diener admitted that he

discussed with Tiffany the higher child support and his desire
that Tiffany not pursue an alimony claim . . . ."
Appellee, p. 5.

Brief of

Again, that is not entirely accurate.

Erich

testified that had no discussions with Tiffany in negotiations

3

for settlement of the divorce regarding increased child support
in exchange for waiver of alimony.
6.

Transcript, p. 42-43.

Tiffany asserts "After the parties agreed to the terms,

Tiffany moved back to Salt Lake City and pursued the divorce
action."

Brief of Appellee, p. 5.

If this assertion were

accurate, then she entirely failed to put the "agreed upon terms"
in the divorce papers.

Neither the parties' original settlement

stipulation nor the original decree recite the terms of this
alleged increased child support agreement.

The parties7

unwritten "agreement" is so indefinite and amorphous and so
lacking in terms to be unenforceable.1
7.

Ms. Diener states, "Pursuant to their agreement, the

parties entered into a stipulation whereby Mr. Diener agreed to
pay $400 a month in child support."

Brief of Appellee, p. 5.

However, no finding in the original Findings of Fact in 1998
support any such bargain or agreement, or support child support
in excess of the guidelines (see R. 26). No indication of any
such bargain or agreement is found in the parties' Stipulation

1

The terms in the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (R.
10) specifically decline alimony: "This is a brief marriage of
3-1/2 years duration. The parties are able-bodied and able to
provide for their own support and neither shall pay alimony to
the other." Stipulation, p. 4 (R. 13). The original Findings of
Fact reads identical (R. 29). Finally, the Decree of Divorce
declines alimony. Decree, p. 3 (R. 35).
4

and Settlement Agreement (see R. 10). Finally, there is no
indication of any such bargain or agreement in the parties'
Decree of Divorce (see R. 33).
8.

Ms. Diener recites a litany of figures related to Mr.

Diener's alleged income.

Brief of Appellee, p. 6-7.

She

concludes that "Mr. Diener received income between $1,751 and
$2,281 per month."

Brief of Appellee, p. 7.

not findings made by the lower court.

Those figures were

See Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 203-205).
9.

Ms. Diener states "Mr. Diener . . . terminated his

employment with Tucci's . . . "
with TEKsystems . . . ."

and "he terminated his employment

Brief of Appellee, p. 7.

statements are distortions.

These

Tiffany appears to suggest that Mr.

Diener voluntarily ended employment with these employers.
is no such evidence to support such a suggestion.

There

Rather, Mr.

Diener testified that no further work was available to him
through TEKsystems.

Transcript, p. 24.

No evidence was offered

as to Mr. Diener's termination of employment from Tucci's.

See

Transcript, p. 22.
10.

Appellee states that "Mr. Diener was earning about

$1,450 a month at the time of trial."

Brief of Appellee, p. 7.

The lower court, however, found that Mr. Diener's "gross income

5

is approximately $1,032.00 per month . . . ."

3/25/2003 Order,

p. 3 (R. 205).
11.

Appellee suggests that "Mr. Diener occasionally

attempts to qualify [his stipulation that $1,750.00 be imputed to
him] by saying it was offered only if the trial court found that
there was a substantial change of circumstances and only if the
trial court would indeed modify the child support provisions . .
. ."

Brief of Appellee, p. 9.

Appellee suggests that Mr. Diener

was trying to be "clever" by the stipulation.
accusation is baseless and inaccurate.

Id.

Appellee's

Mr. Diener's stipulation

was acknowledged by the court as follows:
Although his most recent financial declaration
shows his actual income at -$245.00 per month, for the
sole purpose of calculating child support provided a
modification is granted in the current proceeding,
defendant stipulated that income may be imputed to him
at a total of $1,750.00 per month which approximates
what would have been his income had [he] been working
full time . . . ."
Order Re: Trial Date, p. 2 (R. 144)(emphasis added)(copy attached
hereto).

Mr. Diener stipulated that the amount of $1,750.00

could be used for the purpose of calculating child support, jLf
the court found basis for modification.

Transcript, p. 29.

The

purpose behind Mr. Diener's stipulation was to facilitate
settlement/resolution of this matter, and to benefit his child.
Erich Diener testified that he did not actually earn that amount.

6

Transcript, p. 29.

That amount represented what he would earn ij.

he were able to work full-time at his current rate.

REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY § 78-45-7.2

(6) .
Tiffany Diener's position stems from an alleged agreement
between the parties that Mr. Diener would pay increased child
support as "a bargained-for consideration where each of the
parties made significant concessions in reaching that agreement."
3/25/2003 Order, p. 2 (R. 203). As set forth more fully in Mr.
Diener's principle brief, there was no finding in the original
Findings of Fact in 1998 with regard to any such bargain (see R.
26).

There is no indication of any such bargain in the parties'

Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (see R. 10). Finally, there
is no indication of any such bargain in the parties' Decree of
Divorce (see R. 33).
Appellee incorrectly states Mr. Diener's "position . . .
changed when it became obvious that his income had not changed
enough to prove a substantial change in circumstances."
Appellee, p. 10.

That is incorrect.

Brief of

Mr. Diener argued, "The

decree of divorce should be modified and amended to recalculate
defendant's child support obligations, etc. in light of the

7

substantial change of circumstances of both parties."

Petition

for Modification, \ 8 (R. 45-46)(underlined emphasis added).
In addition, Mr. Diener argued early in this matter that he
is entitled to a modification based upon both a substantial
change to the parties' circumstances and pursuant to the passage
of three (3) years "since the divorce decree was entered."
Defendant's Response to Motion to Dismiss Petitioner for
Modification, p. 1-2 (R. 58-59) .

The lower court allowed Mr.

Diener to argue for a modification on both grounds.

Both were

preserved below and are ripe for review on appeal.
The cases cited by Tiffany Diener in support of her brief,
are inapposite.

The cases cited involve specific written

agreements, with specified terms incorporated into the parties'
decree.

Those cases instruct that parties are bound by a written

property settlement; those cases do not support the same for an
unwritten "agreement."
In Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), the appellate
court was called upon to interpret

u

the term 'equity' as it

appeals in the stipulation and property settlement agreement."
Id. at 1249.

Thus, there was a clear, written agreement for the

court to review.

Indeed, the "decree specifically adopted the

provisions of the written stipulation . . . ."

Id.

Thus, "the

law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court where a
8

property settlement agreement has been incorporated into the
decree . . . ."

Id. at 1251.

In Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 723 (Utah 1990), again, the
appellate court was called upon to review written terms of a
divorce decree, that varied from statutory rights ("The agreed
decree provided for termination of support upon the death or
emancipation of a child.

The decree stated four events that

would constitute emancipation but stated that emancipation would
be postponed if [a child was enrolled in higher education]."
(underlined emphasis added)).

Id.

Herein, neither the original

stipulation nor the original decree contain the terms that
Tiffany now seeks to enforce.

There is no mention whatsoever of

any bargained-for-exchange agreement asserted by Tiffany.
In Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981), the obligor
spouse "entered into a stipulation and property settlement
agreement with the plaintiff, which was approved and incorporated
in the decree by the trial court."
emphasis added).

Id. at 526 (underlined

The defendant in Despain

failed to observe the distinction between those cases
involving the statutory power of the court in a divorce
proceeding to enter orders concerning support that thsoe
cases in which the parties in a divorce action has
settled their property rights by agreement# the terms of
which are incorporated in a decree.

9

Id. at 527 (underlined emphasis added).

The appellate court

continued, "The limitations on the power of the court to order
support do not limit the rights of the husband and wife to
contract with respect to the education of their children as a
part of an agreement settling their property rights."

Id.

From Land and Despain, it is clear that lower courts retain
jurisdiction to enforce the written terms of parties' agreements
that are incorporated in a decree.2

The court herein, however,

lacks jurisdiction to enforce an unwritten, oral agreement some
five (5) years after it was allegedly made.

If the bargained-

for-exchange that Tiffany Diener alleges was incorporated in the
parties' decree, Erich Diener would have no claim.

However,

Tiffany Diener seeks to enforce an agreement that was neither
written at the time it was allegedly made, nor incorporated into
the parties' settlement stipulation and decree.
Finally, appellee argues that Mr. Diener attempts "to rely
. . . on a new statute to retain the benefit of his bargain i.e.,
not having to defend claims [by Tiffany] . . . ."
Appellee, p. 13.

Brief of

The statute in question, Utah Code Ann. § 78-

45-7.2 (1953 as amended), is not a "new statute."

It was enacted

in 1989, when the child support guidelines were first

2

In addition, the court would have jurisdiction to modify
based upon statutory grounds set forth by the legislature.
10

established.

The statute indicates "The guidelines apply to any

judicial or administrative order establishing an award of child
support entered on or after July 1, 1989."
45-7.2 (1) (1953 as amended).3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-

The statute was in effect when

the parties' decree was entered.

Thus, Ms. Diener is less than

accurate in describing the pertinent statute as "new."
Erich Diener is entitled to an adjustment of child support
based upon the passage of three (3) years and the non-temporary
difference of 10% pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953
as amended)(subsequently renumbered to subsection (8)). In light
of the passage of three (3) years from the date the decree was
entered herein, the court below erred by refusing to recalculate
child support pursuant to the guidelines and order Erich Diener
to pay the resulting amount.

3

Furthermore, the statute mandates "Notice of the
opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (6) and
(7) shall be included in each child support order issued or
modified after July 1, 1997." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2
(8) (subsequently renumbered to subsection (10)) . This provision
was enacted nearly one (1) year prior to entry of the parties'
decree herein, prepared by Tiffany Diener's counsel. The decree
failed to contain such a notice.

11

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN THE PARTIES' CIRCUMSTANCES:
Ms. Diener now acknowledges that "a showing of a
substantial, or material change in the circumstances [can] modify
. . . bargained-for terms in a decree."
11; see also Brief of Appellee, 18.4

Brief of Appellee, p.

The lower court, found

Because the Defendant's financial circumstances have
not changed substantially, the Court finds that there is
no substantial change in circumstances upon which to
justify modification of the child support Order under §
78-45-7.2 (7), Utah Code.
3/25/2003 Order, p. 6 (R. 207). As set forth in Mr. Diener's
principle brief, such a conclusion does not flow from the
testimony presented at trial, nor does it flow from the
subsidiary findings made by the court.
Ms. Diener asserts that "the trial court had ample evidence
to impute income to Mr. Diener in excess of his income at the
time of the divorce . . . ."

Brief of Appellee, p. 15.5

The

lower court, however, made findings that clearly establish a

4

Appellee admits that Mr. Diener can adjust child support
pursuant to a substantial change in circumstances. However,
appellee argues that the "three (3) year rule" does not apply.
The distinction is illogical. Both are statutory rights. Both
rights must be included in all decrees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7.2 (1953 as amended). Appellee's concession defeats the
claim that there is an enforceable agreement.
5

The lower court did not impute income to Mr. Diener. To
do so, the court must make specific findings. Utah Code Ann. §
78-45-7.5 (1953 as amended).
12

substantial change in the parties' circumstances.

The lower

found:
[Mr. Diener] was temporarily employed by Circuit
City, . . . making about $1,2 00.00.
[Mr. Diener] was employed by TEKsystems . . ., from
July 1998 through September 2001 . . . . [He lost said]
job because of the down-turn of the economy and the
computer technology industry.
[Mr. Diener] was unemployed
through November 2 0 01.

from September 2 001

[Mr. Diener] was employed at Tucci's restaurant from
November 2 0 01 through October 2 0 02, earning approximately
$1,560.00 per month, including tips.
*

*

*

[Mr. Diener] worked on contract for TEKsystems . .
. in 2002. He earned a total of $3,655.00 . . . .
*

*

*

[Mr. Diener] has provided technical computer
assistance and consulting to the Utah Legal Clinic in
trade for legal services . . . [totaling $1,200.00 in
2001 and $1,912.50 in 2002].
•

*

*

[Mr. Diener] enlisted in the Utah National Guard in
2002. [He] earns approximately $245.00 per month.
[Mr. Diener] began working part-time for Gateway
Academy . . . .
*
*
* [His] gross income is
approximately $1,032.00 per month . . . .
3/25/2003 Order, p. 3-4 (R. 204-205)(numbering omitted).
Finally, the court specifically found that Mr. Diener requires a
college degree u to again obtain gainful employment at a
reasonable rate of pay."

3/25/2003 Order, p. 4 (R. 205).

13

In spite of these specific findings, the court concluded
that Erich Diener's "financial circumstances have not changed
substantially .. . ."

3/25/2003 Order, p. 6 (R. 207).

conclusion is erroneous.

Such a

Erich Diener's financial circumstances

have changed substantially.

His ability to earn has been

substantially altered, and his earnings have significantly
decreased.
Tiffany Diener argues that "the trial court would have
imputed at least $1,750 monthly income to Mr. Diener . . . and
$1,192 to Tiffany . . . ."

The lower court did not do so.

Rather, the lower court found that Mr. Diener's "gross income is
approximately $1,032.00 per month . . . ."

3/25/2003 Order, p. 3

(R. 205). Mr. Diener stipulated that an amount of $1,750.00
could be used for the purpose of calculating child support, only
if the court found basis for modification.6

Transcript, p. 28;

Order Re: Trial Date (R. 144). Mr. Diener did not waive his
right to claim a substantial change in circumstances.

He should

be permitted to request modifications pursuant to § 78-45-7.2
(6)&(7)(1953 as amended).

Mr. Diener did not stipulate that

6

Mr. Diener argued that minimum wage ($886.00) be imputed
to Tiffany Diener. Mr. Diener did not argue that an income of
$1,192.00 be imputed to Tiffany Diener. Memorandum of Law/Trial
Memorandum Re: Child Support, p. 4-5 (R. 156-157).
14

amount be used to determine whether there was a change in his
earnings, as asserted by Tiffany.
Tiffany Diener misstates Erich's argument regarding the
change in Tiffany Diener's circumstances.
p. 15.

See Brief of Appellee,

Erich Diener has never suggested that the court solely

focus on Tiffany Diener's new circumstances.

Rather, the court

must view the overall change in both parties' circumstances.
The language of the statute reads:
(7) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may
at any time petition the court to adjust the amount of a
child support order if there has been a substantial
change in circumstances.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (7) (a) , a substantial
change in circumstances may include:
(i) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or
assets of the parties;
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income
of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to
earn;
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the
child; and
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities
of either parent for the support of others.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (7)(a)&(b) (1953 as amended).
language in the statute references both parties.

The

Herein, there

have been substantial changes in both parties' lives.

Indeed,

the lower court made specific findings that should have resulted
in a legal conclusion that there are substantial changes to both
parties' circumstances.
15

In light of the overall, substantial change in the parties'
circumstances, the lower court erred in failing to recalculate
child support pursuant to the guidelines.
III. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD CAN BE MET BY A
REDUCTION OF CHILD SUPPORT.
Appellee misstates Mr. Diener's argument regarding the
whether a reduction could ever be in the best interests of child.
Appellee states, "Mr. Diener will be hard-pressed to establish .
. . that it would be in 'the best interests' of his minor
daughter for her father to pay a significantly reduced child
support payments because the custodial parent is not earning any
income."

Brief of Appellee, p. 16 (underlined emphasis added).

Such was never Mr. Diener's argument.

Rather, Mr. Diener

asks this Court to consider whether it would ever be in the best
interests of the child to decrease child support.

See generally

Transcript, p. 80-81 ("[C]an you conceive of a situation where
reducing someone's child support would be in the best interest of
the child?").

The issue presented for review is set forth in Mr.

Diener's principle brief:

u

Is it ever in the child's best

interest to reduce support?"

Brief of Appellant, p. 3.

Appellee largely ignores the analysis in Overby v. Overby,
698 So.2d 811 (Fl. 1997).

The Overby court recognized that a

"need for retraining when a skill is no longer needed and the
16

need for increased education to enhance income [could be]
important factors that may be considered [in reducing child
support]."

Id.

In that case, the Florida judiciary resolved

that "the focus should be whether the temporary reduction will be
in the best interests of the [child]."

Id.

A temporary

reduction would be permissible if the long term effect would
benefit the children.7
Arizona has similarly recognized the importance of a
temporary modification of a child support that may lead to long
term economic benefit for the child.
108, 111 (Ariz. 1999).

Little v. Little, 975 P.2d

Appellee ignores this aspect of the

Arizona decision, and rather cites language mandating "the duty
[to support one's children] persists, with full authority in the
State to enforce it."

Id. at 114.

to abdicate his duty of support.

Mr. Diener has never sought

Rather, he has sought to have

his child support obligation calculated as per the statutory
guidelines.

Thus, his position fully comports with the Tiffany's

citation to the Little case.

7

"In light of today's fast paced changing age of technology, trial judges will have to evaluate, on a case by case
basis, whether a temporary reduction in child support payments
due to a payor's pursuit of an enhanced education will eventually
be legally beneficial to the recipients." Overby, 698 So.2d at
815.
17

Erich Diener is neither voluntarily unemployed nor
voluntarily underemployed.

The trial court specifically found

that Mr. Diener requires a college degree "to again obtain
gainful employment at a reasonable rate of pay."
Order, p. 4 (R. 205).

3/25/2003

In determining the best interests of the

child, this Court should allow a reduction in child support based
upon the facts herein, and set child support as per the statutory
guidelines.

IV.

MR. DIENER DOES NOT HAVE UNCLEAN HANDS.

Appellee asserts "Mr. Diener admitted he did not tell
Tiffany he was earning $55,000 a year . . . . "

Brief of

Appellee, p. 18 (citing Transcript, p. 39). That assertion
distorts the trial testimony and misleads this Court.

The actual

testimony referenced by appellee is as follows:
Q. [By John Call]
Let's talk a little bit about
your employment with TEKsystems: During the time you were
erning $55,000 a year, did you offer to pay more child
support?
A.
[By Erich Diener] No, sir.
Q. Did you ever go to Tiffany and say, "Gosh, I'm
making more, I'd like to pay a little more?"
A. No, sir.
Transcript, p. 39.

Nowhere is there any indication of deceit,

fraud, or misdeeds on behalf of Mr. Diener in this exchange.
Nowhere is there any indication that Mr. Diener hid his income
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from Tiffany.8

Indeed, Tiffany was aware at all times of Mr.

Diener's various employers.

Nothing prevented Tiffany from

seeking a modification of the child support obligation based upon
Mr. Diener's earnings at TEKsystems.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The lower court erred in denying Erich Diener's request to
modify the decree to adjust child support.

Erich Diener is

entitled to an adjustment in child support pursuant to Utah law
after the passage of three (3) years.

Furthermore, Erich Diener

is entitled to a modification based upon the substantial change
in the parties' circumstances.

Finally, the lower court erred in

finding a bargained-for exchange of alimony for increased child
support, particularly in light of the fact that no mention of
said bargain is found in the parties' original divorce papers.

8

The parties' Decree of Divorce does not contain a
provision whereby the parties must exchange income information on
a yearly basis. Any suggestion that Mr. Diener "hid" his income
is baseless.
19

The lower court should recalculate child support pursuant to
the guidelines, based upon the parties' current income, and order
Erich Diener to pay the resulting amount.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of NOVEMBER 2003.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT/APPELLANT

BRIAN M
JAMES L
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BARNARD
HARRIS, Jr.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
JOHN W. CALL
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT, L.C.
Attorneys for APPELLEE
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
and
MADELYN M. IBARRA
TAMMY R. WEIS
BEVERLY A. BORTOLUSSI
CARLA M. FULLER
ORS Agents
STEPHANIE SAPERSTEIN
Attorney for Office of Recovery Services
P.O. BOX 45011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0011
on the 21st day of NOVEMBER, 2003, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.

UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT LN AND S §M l K t

SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

OUUNrY

Daputy Clork

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER,

ORDER RE: TRIAL DATE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 98-490-1948 DA

ERICH ROSS DIENER,

(Hon. F. NOEL)
(Comm. Michael Evans)

Deferdant.

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the court for
a telephone scheduling conference on January 7, 2003 at 10:15
a.m., the plaintiff being represented by John Call, the defendant
being represented by Brian M. Barnard, based thereon and for good
cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
This matter is set for a one (1) day bench trial on
Thursday, February 6, 2003 beginning at 10:00 a.m. on defendant's
petition for modification;

The parties shall submit written trial briefs dealing with
any applicable issues of law on or before Wednesday, February 5,
2003 at noon; and,
Although his most recent financial declaration shows his
actual income at -$245.00 per month, for the sole purpose of
calculating child support provided a modification is granted in
the current proceeding, defendant stipulated that income may be
imputed to him at total of $1,750.00 per month which approximates
what would have been his income had been working full time at
Tucci's, where he was most recently employed.
Dated this^V V

day of JANUARY 2003.
BY THE COURTS

FRANK NOEL
Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER RE: TRIAL DATE to:
JOHN W. CALL

FAX 364-6403

Attorney for
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER, Plaintiff
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
MADELYN M. IBARRA
TAMMY R. WEIS
BEVERLY A. BORTOLUSSI
CARLA M. FULLMER
OPS Agents
STEPHANIE SAPERSTEIN
Attorney for ORS
P.O. Box 45011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0011
on the 8™ day of JANUARY 2003, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
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